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COMMENT
NEW YORK: THE NEXT MECCA FOR JUDGMENT
CREDITORS? AN ANALYSIS OF KOEHLER v.
BANK OF BERMUDA LTD.
Damien H. Weinstein*
New York may have just become a greatplace to be a judgment creditor.
In the summer of 2009, the Court of Appeals of New York handed down its
decision in Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd. In Koehler, the court upheld
a turnover order directing a garnishee to transfer a nonresidentjudgment
debtor's assets, deposited in a Bermuda bank, into New York. Under
Koehler, assets anywhere in the world may now be garnishable in New
York so long as the garnishee is subject to the state's jurisdiction. This
decision greatly broadens New York courts'power to enforce judgments by
reachingproperty located outside of New York. Accordingly, the decision
is an incredible victory for judgment creditors, yet a serious defeat for
judgment debtors. Because of New York's status as a financial and
corporate capital-and the concomitant number of institutions doing
business within the state-this decision has a potentially far-reaching
impact. Perhaps not surprisingly,the Koehler decision raises some serious
constitutional and policy concerns. As some commentators fear, the
decision may ultimately turn New York courts into a "mecca "forjudgment
creditors seeking to reach assets located anywhere in the world. This
Comment seeks to explore the issues raised by the Koehler decision. In
doing so, this Comment analyzes theories of due process and state power in
the realm of postjudgment garnishments. This Comment ultimately
concludes that the Koehler decision was correctly decided, particularly
because it will afford judgment creditors an incredibly useful tool in
satisfying theirjudgments.
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INTRODUCTION

My mind is made up. I will have no more to do with this class of
business. I can do business in Court, but I can not, and will not, follow
executions all over the world.
- Abraham Lincoln, as a practicing attorney, expressing his
frustration over his inability to collect on a judgment.'
Imagine a typical lawsuit. The suit takes place in Maryland. The
plaintiff is from Maryland. The defendant is from Bermuda. The events
leading to the suit-say, breach of contract-took place in Maryland.
Maryland's jurisdiction is not an issue. At trial, the plaintiff prevails.

1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Samuel C. Davis & Co. (Nov. 17, 1858), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1858-1860, at 338 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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Armed with this judgment and seeking a court to enforce it, the plaintiffnow a judgment creditor-goes to.. . New York? Why New York?
Next, imagine that the defendant-now a judgment debtor-has stock
certificates deposited in a bank in Bermuda which itself has a subsidiary in
New York. Can the judgment creditor garnish the bank's subsidiary in New
York and compel it to bring the stock certificates from Bermuda into the
state?
Such were the facts in a recent case before the New York Court of
Appeals. A deeply divided Court of Appeals, in Koehler v. Bank of
Bermuda Ltd.,2 held that a "New York [court] may order a bank over which
it has personal jurisdiction [as garnishee] to deliver stock certificates" into
the state, even when those certificates are located outside New York. 3 This
decision has incredible implications for the practice of enforcing judgments.
Specifically, the Koehler decision makes assets located all over the world
subject to garnishment in New York if they are held by a corporation doing
business directly or indirectly within the state. 4 Under Koehler, judgment
creditors seeking to enforce a judgment in New York no longer have to
prove that the judgment debtor has assets located within the state.
Judgment creditors may use the Koehler decision as a weapon against
judgment debtors seeking to shield foreign assets from garnishment.
Accordingly, the decision is a serious blow to judgment debtors: their
assets located throughout the world may potentially be vulnerable to
garnishment in New York.
5
As one could imagine, the majority's opinion prompted a stern dissent.
The dissenters cautioned that the ruling raises serious constitutional and
policy concerns. 6 Thus far, at least some commentators seem to share the
dissent's misgivings. For example, one commentator has recently noted
that the Koehler decision, by vastly broadening New York's garnishment
reach, will create an opportunity for forum shopping. 7 In his article,
Professor David D. Siegel notes that the decision's broad reach may invite

2. 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009).
3. See id. at 827.
4. The reach of this decision cannot be understated: New York maintains a unique
status as a global financial center and is home -either directly or through subsidiaries or
branches-to many financial institutions and large corporations. As a recent article on the
decision states, New York's status as a financial capital of the world also already makes it a
"key enforcement venue." James E. Berger, New York Court of Appeals Permits
ExtraterritorialSeizure of Assets in Aid of Judgments, PRATT's J. BANKR. L., Sept.-Oct.
2009, at 433, 434.
5. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J., dissenting); infra Part lI.D.
6. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("Its policy implications are
troubling, and it may well be unconstitutional in many of its applications.").
7. See David D. Siegel, 'Koehler': Creating Mecca for Creditors or Anti-mecca for
Garnishees?,N.Y. L.J., July 28, 2009, at 4.
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judgment creditors to New York or, conversely,
scare off garnishees such as
8
banks from doing business within the state.
Equally important is the concern regarding the constitutional validity of
the exercises of state power sanctioned by Koehler. Although judicial
analysis of state jurisdiction has changed shapes over the years, it is limited
by vague concepts such as "fairness." 9 Accordingly, as extraterritorial
postjudgment garnishments inherently raise jurisdictional concerns, real
questions might exist about the fairness of permitting a judgment debtor's
assets to be garnished in a jurisdiction other than where the assets are
located. 10
A proper analysis of the Koehler decision, and its possible implications,
requires a background understanding of the issues the decision raises. Part I
of this Comment discusses the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisdictional analysis. This will be relevant in order to understand fully the
due process and state power concerns raised by the Koehler case. Part I
also explains the garnishment procedure and how different courts have
interpreted the jurisdictional basis for such proceedings. Part II details the
factual background of the Koehler decision, the arguments and rationales
put forth by both parties, and the court's majority and dissenting decisions.
Part III dissects the Koehler holding into two issues: postjudgment due
process considerations and extraterritorial garnishments. This Comment
concludes that the majority's holding in Koehler was correct in finding that
typical prejudgment due process concerns should not apply to postjudgment
garnishment proceedings. Further, Koehler properly held that New York
courts may garnish property outside of their territorial borders.
I. BACKGROUND ON STATE JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS AND

POSTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENTS

Part L.A briefly discusses the constitutional origins of due process
concerns.
Part I.A.l specifically discusses the Supreme Court's in
personam jurisdictional analysis. Part I.A.2 discusses the Supreme Court's
in rem jurisdictional analysis. Part I.B describes the postjudgment
garnishment procedure and how different courts and commentators have
differed in its definition and classification. Part I.C discusses the distinction
authorities draw between prejudgment and postjudgment procedures and
how, if at all, the distinction changes a court's due process analysis.

8. Id. (noting that the Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd. decision "can make New York
a mecca for judgment creditors-or, on the contrary, a badlands for garnishees"). A
somewhat analogous concern has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context
of child visitation rights. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (finding that a
state's broad exercise of jurisdiction over an absent parent would "discourage parents from
entering into reasonable visitation agreements").
9. See infra Part I.A. 1-2.
10. See, e.g., infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
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A. Piecing TogetherJurisdiction: The Supreme Court's "Thousand-Piece
Jigsaw Puzzle" 1 I

Understanding the jurisdictional and due process concerns raised by the
Koehler decision requires a closer look at the basic themes of the area. The

Supreme Court has established the proper analysis of state court
jurisdiction.

Jurisdictional analysis, however, may be as difficult to

understand as a "thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle," at least in part, because the
method of evaluating and determining a state's exercise of jurisdiction has
taken different shapes over time.1 2 Yet, the consistent overriding concern
has been to permit states only to exercise jurisdiction in a manner that
comports with the U.S. Constitution. Although not expressly stated, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures that

"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law,"' 3 has been understood to limit the valid exercise of
state jurisdiction. 14 Thus, the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the
Due Process Clause, as it pertains to jurisdictional matters, is directly
relevant to the arguments of the Koehler parties highlighted in this
Comment. 15 In Koehler, the parties differed as to whether the garnishing

11. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of PersonalJurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 19, 20 (1990).
12. See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal
Jurisdiction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1987) ("Even after numerous Supreme Court
decisions spanning the past several years, the subject remains imponderable."); see also infra
Part I.A. 1-2.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their
enforcement in the State resisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to
determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law."); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN &
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (2d ed. 2006);
Borchers, supra note 11, at 23 n. 11 (listing authorities understanding jurisdictional analysis
to be limited by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution); James Weinstein, The
Federal Common Law Origins of JudicialJurisdiction: Implicationsfor Modern Doctrine,
90 VA. L. REv. 169, 209-22 (2004); Note, The Requirement of Seizure in the Exercise of
Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff Re-examined, 63 HARV. L. REV. 657, 670
(1950) ("The basic principle that in our federal system the courts of a state must confine their
action to persons or property having some physical connection with its territory has been
embedded in the due-process and full-faith-and-credit clauses of the Federal Constitution.").
Equally as relevant to the enforcement of sister state judgments is the fact that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution guarantees valid judgments from one state will be
recognized in another state. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421
(1979); see also Botz v. Helvering, 134 F.2d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 1943) (noting that the Full
Faith and Credit provision is applicable in federal courts). Accordingly, a judgment
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over a defendant is invalid and may not be enforced
in a sister state. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850).
15. This Comment will focus on particular Supreme Court decisions in the area of due
process and jurisdiction. For a more thorough history of the jurisprudence in the field, see
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
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court needed jurisdiction over just the garnishee, or whether the court must
also have jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 16 In order to provide
context for the debate, a detailed overview and discussion of the
development of both in personam and in rem jurisdictional analysis will be
helpful.
1. In Personam Analysis: From "Is It There?" to "Is It Fair?" 17 The
Supreme Court's Road from Pennoyer to InternationalShoe and Beyond
For many years the case of Pennoyer v. Nefll 8 was the fundamental
jurisprudence on the issue of state court jurisdiction. 19 In Pennoyer, the
Supreme Court distinguished between two types of jurisdictional
proceedings: in rem and in personam. 20 Suits "where the entire object of
the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
defendants" are considered proceedings in personam. 2 1 On the other hand,
suits in which "the object of the action is to reach and dispose of property22in
the State, or of some interest therein" are considered proceedings in rem.
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer stood for the proposition that
a state's valid exercise of its jurisdiction was limited by its territorial
boundaries. 23 Therefore, control over the person or his property, satisfied
Jurisdictionof State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569
(1958); Weinstein, supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 148, 179-81 and accompanying text.
17. Arizona v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 221 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
18. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For helpful background information on the Pennoyer v. Neff
decision, see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered,62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987); Linda J. Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End ofAn Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 44-53 (1978).
19. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 24 (1986) ("Any discussion of the due process clause and personal
jurisdiction must begin with Pennoyer v. Neff, the foundation of Supreme Court discourse on
the subject.").
20. See Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 727.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also BRILMAYER, supra note 19, at 21 ("An action in rem is a lawsuit that
establishes a party's ownership of property against the claims of all others."). For a more
focused analysis of in rem jurisdiction, and the leading cases, see Part I.A.2. Quasi in rem
jurisdiction is a third type of jurisdiction. Although not defined in the Pennoyer decision,
quasi in rem jurisdiction concerns "the interests of particular persons in designated
property." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
23. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. "[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory." Id. at 722 (citing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (6th ed. 1865); HENRY WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 2 ch. 2 (3d ed. 1846)); see also BRILMAYER, supra
note 19, at 23 (noting that "[t]he original due process limit was based on the finite power of
the state court: the forum had no power to adjudicate a matter unless the person or property
was somehow physically present"). A second and equally important principle set forth in
Pennoyer was that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Thus, territorial
boundaries not only limited a state's jurisdiction, but also served as a shield from the reach
of sister states. However, at least one author has criticized the common understanding that
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by a presence within the jurisdiction, was required.24 Accordingly, any
exercise of jurisdiction beyond state lines was inherently void and
unconstitutional. 25 Only if the person or property could be found in the
state, the Court held, could it properly be acted upon by the courts of that
jurisdiction.2 6 If it were not present, "there is nothing upon which the
tribunals 8 can adjudicate." 27 This rule became known as the "power
2
theory."
In 1945, the Supreme Court changed the focus of analyzing state court
29
jurisdiction in the landmark case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.
In International Shoe, the appellant, a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Missouri, sold shoes in various states across
Although the company sold shoes in the state of
the country. 30
Washington, it maintained no offices there nor made any contracts within
the Supreme Court in Pennoyerwas limiting the power of state court jurisdiction based upon
the Due Process Clause. See Patrick J. Borchers, Pennoyer's Limited Legacy: A Reply to
Professor Oakley, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 115, 118 (1995) (arguing that the decision in
Pennoyer "did not clearly link due process and jurisdiction" and that "[t]here are strong
pragmatic justifications for rejecting constitutionalized state court jurisdiction"). This
argument, however, seems to ignore that the Supreme Court has since expressly stated the
contrary. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987) ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to exert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.").
24. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("Historically the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court
was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him." (citing Pennoyer, 95
U.S. at 733)); David H. Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A PreliminaryInquiry into the
Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997, 999 (1978) (noting that Pennoyer's
power doctrine made the physical presence of property in the forum sufficient for the state to
exercise jurisdiction over it).
25. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (citing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 165
(1850)).
26. See id. at 723.
27. Id. at 723-24.
28. See Holly S. Haskew, Comment, Shaffer, Burnham, and New York's Continuing Use
of QIR-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection of the Power Theory, 45 EMORY L.J. 239, 239 (1996);
Silberman, supra note 18, at 45.
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)
(noting that the Supreme Court responded to the increased commerce between the states by
changing the requirements of personal jurisdiction from the "rigid rule" of Pennoyer to the
more "flexible" approach of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington); Avery Dennison Corp.
v. UCB SA, No. 95 C 6351, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2931, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 1997)
(noting that "InternationalShoe ...replaced Pennoyer's 'presence' test with the minimum
contacts approach"); Borchers, supra note 11, at 54 n.215 (listing commentaries noting how
InternationalShoe represented a change in course from the existing Pennoyeranalysis); Earl
M. Maltz, PersonalJurisdiction and Constitutional Theory-A Comment on Burnham v.
Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 694 (1991) (noting that International Shoe was a
"landmark departure" from existing jurisprudence). For a detailed analysis of the facts and
opinion of the InternationalShoe case, see Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson,
Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International
Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1995); Kurland, supra note 15, at 586-93.
30. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
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the state. 3 1 Instead, the company employed approximately a dozen
salesmen in the state to solicit orders, which would then be received and
processed in Missouri. 32 When sued in the state of Washington, the
company insisted that it was not present within the state and thus could not
33
be subject to its jurisdiction.
In holding that the shoe company was subject to Washington's courts'
jurisdiction, 34 the Supreme Court set forth what has become known as the
"minimum contacts" test for exercising jurisdiction. This test, in certain
cases, permits the extension of state court jurisdiction beyond the territorial
borders to persons located outside the state. 35 The decision in International
36
Shoe undeniably expanded the jurisdictional reach of state courts.
The Court began its opinion by referencing its previous decision in
Pennoyer and its holding that jurisdiction was defined by a state's territorial
limits. 37 However, in noting that methods of personal service had since
changed, the Court held,
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit38does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
The Court elaborated that not just any contact with the forum state would
suffice. 39 Instead, courts should focus on the quality and quantity of the
40
contacts.
Since InternationalShoe, the Court has continued to elaborate upon its
minimum contacts analysis. In addition to assessing the nature of the
contacts, courts must also consider (1) the inconvenience of hailing the
defendant into the state to defend himself,4 1 (2) the forum state's interest in

31. Id.
32. Id.at 313-14.
33. Id.at 315.
34. Id. at 320.
35. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. The Court was, perhaps, reacting to
the fact that times had changed. In reality, the Court realized, large corporations and entities
could essentially have a "presence" in whichever jurisdiction their activities reached. See
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. This is certainly true for bigger corporations, such as the Bank
of Bermuda, the garnishee in Koehler. As discussed below, the fact that such corporations
may be "present" in multiple jurisdictions at the same time makes them, and their customers,
vulnerable to garnishment in many different locations. See infra notes 191-92 and
accompanying text.
36. Borchers, supra note 11, at 54.
37. See int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
38. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
39. Id. at 319.
40. Id. ("Whether Due Process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity.").
41. Id.at 317.
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adjudicating the dispute, 4 2 (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief,43 (4) "the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,"' 44 and (5) the
45
interest of the states collectively in furthering fundamental social policies.
Particularly, the Court has held that due process requires there be "some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 4 6 This concept has resonated from another element
of the minimum contacts analysis: the defendant's contacts with the forum
state must not be accidental, fraudulent, or the result of someone else's
actions. 47 Instead, whether due process is satisfied depends upon the
42. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (noting that a state has a
"manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents").
43. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
45. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98.
46. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319); see
also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 108-09 ("[T]he determination whether an exercise
of personal jurisdiction comports with due process 'remains whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum State."' (quoting Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 613 (1990) (citing Wanzer v. Bright,
52 Ill.
35 (1869)) (noting the exceptional cases where in-state presence is insufficient to
establish jurisdiction, such as where individuals were brought into the state by force or
fraud); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1980) (noting that "adventitious" contacts
are insufficient); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937) (noting that
presence fraudulently induced makes judgment null and void (citing Thompson v.
Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913); Lucy v. Deas, 52 So. 515 (Fla. 1910))); Tickle v. Barton,
95 S.E.2d 427, 432-33 (W. Va. 1956) (noting that service upon a party obtained by "fraud,
trickery, artifice or wrongful device, is invalid"). But see Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (holding that the service of a passenger while in an airplane
passing over Arkansas is sufficient presence to establish jurisdiction). In Burnham v.
Superior Court, the Supreme Court sanctioned jurisdiction over individuals temporarily
within the jurisdiction. 495 U.S. at 628. In upholding the exercise of jurisdiction, the Court
cited to cases spreading over the past two centuries that had held that physical presence
within the state was sufficient to support jurisdiction even if the person was only temporarily
in the state and the cause of action was totally unrelated to his presence there. Id. at 612-13.
The Burnham decision has been criticized by many as both irreconcilable with the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text, and
returning to Pennoyer's old territorial reasoning. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v.
Heitner: A Death Warrantfor the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?,25 VILL. L.
REv. 38, 61 (1979) (arguing that transient jurisdiction violates the Shaffer decision); Barbara
Surtees Goto, Note, International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court
Resurrects the Physical Power Theory, 24 LOY.L.A. L. REv. 851, 851 (1991) (noting that
the Burnham decision "reverses the thirteen-year trend away from presence-based
jurisdiction"); Haskew, supra note 28, at 254 (noting that the Burnham decision "resurrected
the power theory of jurisdiction"). The Burnham decision also impacted the decisions of
lower courts, which had held that personal service upon defendants temporarily present did
not confer personal jurisdiction absent other meaningful contacts with the forum. See, e.g.,
Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of the U.S., 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold M. Pitman Co.
v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986). As one author has stated, the
concern over transient jurisdiction can perhaps be summed up by one question: "[H]ow
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affirmative acts by the defendant. 4 8 Requiring minimum contacts and
purposeful availment ensures "a degree of predictability .. . that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit."

49

Although the Court's decision in InternationalShoe broke free, in some
sense, of Pennoyer's power theory, the language of the opinion was strictly
focused on jurisdiction over persons, not things. 50 Thus, while in personam
jurisdiction would be evaluated according to the Court's "minimum
contacts" analysis, in rem jurisdiction appeared to remain subject to
Pennoyer's "territorial" rule. 5 1 In Hanson v. Denckla,52 the Supreme Court
reiterated this point very clearly. 53
2. In Rem Analysis: Shaffer v. Heitner and Harrisv. Balk
In Koehler, the garnishee Bank argued that New York could not garnish
the judgment debtor's assets in Bermuda because garnishments require in
rem jurisdiction. 54 In rem jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to adjudicate
the rights to a given piece of property, including the power to seize and hold
''55 Thus, as
it.
the Supreme Court stated, the proper exercise of in rem
jurisdiction is premised upon "the subject property within the territorial
'56
jurisdiction of the forum State."
In rem jurisdictional analysis has been greatly shaped by two Supreme
Court decisions: Harris v. Balk57 and Shaffer v. Heitner.58 In Harris,
plaintiff Harris owed defendant Balk a certain sum of money. 59 Both men

'fair' is it for a state to subject a person to suit merely because she spent half an hour there
on her way to somewhere else?" BRILMAYER, supra note 19, at 34.
48. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State." (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319)).
49. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. For a more thorough assessment of the
minimum contacts analysis, see Earl M. Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark.- Shaffer v.
Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1043, 1051-68.
50. See generally Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 310-22.
51. See, e.g., State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 221-22 (Ariz. 2009);
Suzanne T. Marquard, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International
Shoe Fits .

. . ,

46 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 459 (1977) (noting that International Shoe's

decision "did not reach other bases of jurisdiction such as in rem, quasi in rem, or physical
presence." (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316)).
52. 357 U.S. 235.
53. Id. at 246 ("The basis of the [in rem] jurisdiction is the presence of the subject
property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State.").
54. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 929 (9th ed. 2009).
56. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246.
57. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
58. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
59. Harris, 198 U.S. at216.
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were residents of North Carolina. 6 0 Balk himself was indebted to a Mr.
Epstein of Maryland. 6 1 When Harris visited Maryland, Epstein served him
with documents attaching the debt due to Balk.62
In challenging
Maryland's exercise of jurisdiction over him, Harris claimed that the debt
he owed to Balk was in North Carolina and out of reach of Maryland
courts.

63

The Court disagreed. 64 Noting that a state law provided for the
attachment of such debt, the Court reasoned that "if the garnishee be found
in [the] State ... the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can
garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff. '65 In so
holding, the Court declared that "[t]he obligation of the debtor to pay his
debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes."' 66 This became
known as the "debt-follows-the-debtor" rule. 6 7 Accordingly, under this
rule, the debt-or property-owed to a judgment creditor by a judgment
debtor could be "found" wherever the judgment debtor, or his garnishee,
68
may be.
69
Years later, however, the Court decided the case of Shaffer v. Heitner,
which vastly changed the conceptual framework of determining a state's
valid exercise of in rem jurisdiction. 70 The Court in Shaffer was asked to
determine the constitutionality of a state statute that allowed the state's
courts to obtain jurisdiction over a non resident defendant by securing his
property within the state. 71 In this case Heitner brought suit against
72
Shaffer, a non resident of Delaware, for acts which took place in Oregon.
Along with his complaint, Heitner sought to obtain jurisdiction over Shaffer
73
by sequestering stock he held in a Delaware corporation.

60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 221.
64. See id. at 222.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925, 943 (S.D.
Miss. 1977); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the

InterstateCorporation,67 COLUM. L. REv. 550, 550 (1967).
68. This theory was significant in the Koehler decision because it would place the
judgment debtor's assets to be garnished in New York. Accordingly, the concern regarding
extraterritorial garnishments would be moot. See infra Part III.C.
69. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
70. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 18 at 71 ("Perhaps even in its most limited aspects,
the Shaffer decision can be deemed revolutionary.").
71. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189.
72. Id. at 190-91.
73. Id. at 190. Although this stock was not physically located in Delaware, a state
statute considered such stock to be present there and thus subject to attachment. See id. at
192.
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The Court began by examining the evolution of in personam
74
jurisdictional jurisprudence since its earlier opinion in Pennoyer.
However, the Court noted, "[n]o equally dramatic change ha[d] occurred in
the law governing jurisdiction in rem." 75 The Court then explained that
asserting jurisdiction over a thing is really, in a way, asserting jurisdiction
"'over the interests of persons in a thing."' 76 In declaring the Delaware law
unconstitutional, the Court extended International Shoe's "minimum
contacts" analysis to determinations of in rem jurisdiction. 7 7 Accordingly,
the Court stated, "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny." 78 In doing so, the Court held that the decisions in Harris and
Pennoyer, to the extent they were inconsistent with the Shaffer standard,
79
were overruled.
The opinion of Shaffer thus makes it very clear that whether or not a
proceeding is considered in rem or in personam, the standard for
jurisdiction is the same: the defendant's connection with the adjudicating
forum must be sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard set
forth in International Shoe.80 While this particular language is relatively
74. See id. at 196-204.
75. Id. at 205; see also State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 221 (Ariz.
2009) ("International Shoe and the cases immediately following it addressed only in
personam jurisdiction. Thus, the sole constitutional issue when a state sought to exercise
either in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction continued to be the one posed by Pennoyer .... ).
76. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 56 introductory note (1971)).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 212. The Court also noted that, while the presence of defendant's property
within a state may indicate his or her contacts with that state, it alone is insufficient to
exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 209.
79. Id. at 212 n.39; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
296 (1980) (noting that Shaffer "abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk"); Robert
Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of an On-Reservation Debt and Related Issues
in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 355, 368
(1998) (noting that Harris's "debt-follows-the-debtor" rule "does not survive modem
constitutional analysis"). Relevant to the parties in Koehler, however, some courts have
considered the Harris "debt-follows-the-debtor" rule as still viable in postjudgment
garnishment proceedings. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 739 S.W.2d
157, 158 (Ark. 1987) (noting that a debt is located wherever the garnishee is located);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 540 A.2d 482 (Md. 1988); Bianco v. Concepts "100",
Inc., 436 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 487, at
825-26 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter NEW YORK PRACTICE] (suggesting that Harris applies in

postjudgment proceedings and that intangible property may be located wherever the
garnishee is); see also Land Mfg., Inc. v. Highland Park State Bank, 470 P.2d 782, 784-85
(Kan. 1970) (noting that the situs of debt in garnishment proceedings "is of little
importance" and citing to Harris);6 AM. JUR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment § 29 (2008).
If this is true, the Koehler court could have avoided the extraterritorial issue merely by
finding the judgment debtor's assets located in New York with the garnishee. Accordingly,
this theory, if valid, would provide another avenue of reasoning for courts faced with the
same issue. See infra Part III.C.
80. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 ("[I]n order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem,
the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'jurisdiction over the
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straightforward, a footnote in the opinion has created much confusion and
speculation. In this footnote, the Court stated,
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that
the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no

unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where
the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have
81
jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.
Footnote thirty-six has become incredibly relevant in the analysis of
postjudgment jurisdiction. A literal reading of the footnote suggests that a
judgment creditor may garnish a judgment debtor's property wherever it
may be, regardless of whether or not the judgment debtor maintains the
requisite minimum contacts with the garnishing forum. Many courts and
commentators have adopted this interpretation. 82 As one commentator
believes, footnote thirty-six recognizes the long-standing concept in U.S.
jurisprudence that one may enforce a judgment in a jurisdiction other than
83
that which rendered the judgment.
But does the language "where the defendant has property" mean that an
enforcing court must actually have the property to be executed upon within
interests of persons in a thing.' The standard for determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the
minimum-contacts standard elucidated in InternationalShoe.").
81. Id. at 210 n.36. For general background information on footnote thirty-six, see
Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, Shaffer's Footnote 36, 109 W. VA. L. REv. 17 (2006).
82. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 275 S.E.2d 42, 45 (Ga. 1981) (citing footnote
thirty-six for support of the proposition that enforcing jurisdictions need not have personal
jurisdiction over the judgment debtor); Oregon ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. Control Data
Corp., 713 P.2d 30, 32 (Or. 1986) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. h (1987) ("[A]n action to enforce a judgment may

usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found, without any necessary
connection between the underlying action and the property, or between the defendant and the
forum."); see also Vernon, supra note 24, at 1007 (citing Shaffer's footnote thirty-six as
evidence that "[tihe Court in Shaffer specifically provided that proceedings to realize on
sister state judgments are exempt from the minimum contacts standard of International
Shoe"). Federal circuits, however, have disagreed as to whether or not footnote thirty-six
requires that the property or assets with the jurisdiction be related to the underlying cause of
action. Compare Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d
1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Shaffer's footnote thirty-six indicates that relatedness
is not required), with Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum
Factory," 283 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that relatedness is required (citing
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209)).
83. See Maltz, supra note 49, at 1046. Earl Maltz states,
One of the difficulties with Marshall's analysis is that on its face it threatens a
mainstay of American jurisprudence-the concept that one can always enforce a
judgment obtained against a defendant in one state by levying against property
located in another state.... The body of the Shaffer opinion suggests that in such a
case the judgment could be enforced only if the judgment debtor has minimum
contacts with the state where the property is located. Such a rule would represent a
radical change from current practice.
Marshall brushed off this problem rather cavalierly in [footnote thirty-six].
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its jurisdiction? This may seem like a fair reading. However, as this
Comment discusses below, courts have interpreted the footnote as allowing
judgment debtors to be ordered to turn over their extraterritorial assets to
satisfy the existing judgment. 84
This discrepancy demonstrates the
ambiguity in the Shaffer footnote. This confusion may be further inflated
when it is difficult to locate precisely certain property. For example, certain
types of intangible property, such as stock or wages, are not as easy to
85
locate as real property.
As one commentator has stated, the Shaffer Court in footnote thirty-six
was probably imagining a relatively standard execution of a judgment
against real property. 86 But the author fairly addresses a more interesting
and complex scenario. 87 Incredibly, this scenario is, in large part, the issue
presented in Koehler. To paraphrase his hypothetical: Imagine if a
judgment debtor lives in New York, where he works at a branch of the ABC
Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place
of business there, but also has branches in numerous states, including
Florida. May a judgment creditor garnish the debtor's wages in Florida? 88
Put another way: If that same judgment debtor maintains a checking
account with Chase Bank in New York, may the creditor garnish this
account at a local Chase branch in, say, Kentucky?
This scenario raises a variety of questions and concerns. To begin, it is
unclear whether or not such garnishment proceedings are in personam or in
rem. Further, it is further unclear whether this even matters after Shaffer.8 9
Perhaps one could argue that in light of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional
jurisprudence, it would not be "fair" to permit such garnishments. This,
however, assumes that fairness is a concern in postjudgment proceedings,
84. See, e.g., infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. It is important to note that
these cases all dealt with judgment debtors directly, not garnishees. This is in part why the
Koehler decision, which dealt with a garnishee, is groundbreaking. This distinction was a
point of debate between the parties in Koehler. See infra notes 155-61,

182-83 and

accompanying text; see also infra notes 206-09, 280-84 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958); McCarthy v. Wachovia
Bank, No. CV 08-1122, 2008 WL 5145602, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2008) (noting that
"such assets are located both everywhere, and nowhere"); see also Pac. Decision Sci. Corp.
v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 109 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that "'[a]n intangible,

unlike real or tangible personal property, has no physical characteristics that would serve as
a basis for assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it depends on what
action is to be taken with reference to it."' (quoting In re Waits' Estate, 146 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal.
1944))). As Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo once stated, the location of intangible property
should be determined based upon "a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice
and convenience in particular conditions." Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins.
Co., 174 N.E. 299, 300 (N.Y. 1931). For a collection of commentary concerning the
complexities of determining the situs of intangible properties, see Silberman, supra note 18,
at 49 n.73.
86. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 369.
87. Id. at 370.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
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and Shaffer's footnote thirty-six seems to indicate that it is not. 90 These
questions present an even larger and more complex issue: the distinction, if
any, between prejudgment and postjudgment proceedings. 9 1 Although this
topic understandably receives little academic attention, 92 it was at the heart
of the debate between the parties in Koehler.93 For example, if typical
prejudgment fairness concerns restrain courts in postjudgment proceedings,
it might hardly seem "fair" to permit a New York court to garnish a
94
Bermuda resident's assets located in Bermuda.
Understanding the issues that are raised by postjudgment extraterritorial
garnishments inherently demands a basic overview of the garnishment
procedure. As will be evident, how courts and practitioners understand
garnishments to operate has an immense impact on the possible reach of
such garnishments. The next section of this Comment will explore the
themes and issues in the area that are relevant to the Koehler decision.
95
B. The "Giant" in the Enforcement Procedure. What Is a Garnishment?

In litigation, the declaration of a judgment does not essentially end the
dispute. Once the plaintiff wins and a judgment is rendered, the judgment
96
must now be enforced. This, unfortunately, is not always an easy process.
Garnishments are a useful tool to assist judgment creditors in collecting on
their judgments. A garnishment is a proceeding brought by a judgment
creditor to collect a debt-or enforce an existing judgment-when such a
judgment is not voluntarily paid. 9 7 A judgment creditor may seek to collect

90. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
91. See infra Part I.C.
92. See Lawrence W. Newman, Jurisdiction To Enforce Foreign Judgments, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 30, 2001, at 3 ("There is far more written and thought about by courts and lawyers with
respect to issues arising out of the commencement of a lawsuit than there is with respect to
procedural issues arising out of occurrences that take place near the end of lawsuits.").
93. See generally infra Part II.B. 1-2.
94. This argument appears to have been endorsed by Justice Stevens in the context of
prejudgment attachment. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("One who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be expected
to know that he has thereby become subject to suit in a forum remote from his residence and
unrelated to the transaction.").
95. Siegel, supra note 7 (noting that a garnishee is a "giant" in the field of enforcement).
The term garnishment is confusingly used by courts to describe both a prejudgment tool used
to attach property and a postjudgment remedy to satisfy an existing judgment. Accordingly,
the term has very different meanings and requires completely different analyses depending
on how it is used. For the purpose of this Comment, unless otherwise stated, any mention of
garnishment refers to the postjudgment context.
96. See Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the Need
for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 113 (2007) ("Collecting on the judgment
or otherwise enforcing a judgment is often laborious and time consuming.").
97. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 356-57. Garnishments, in a sense, reflect the reality
that many judgment debtors may take evasive measures to avoid the enforcement of
judgments against them. See, e.g., Henry E. Rakowski, Enforcing Judgments, J. NASSAU
COUNTY B. Ass'N, Oct. 2002, at 3, 22 ("It is very unlikely that a debtor will 'hold still' and
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the debt due by either attaching the debtor's property directly, or by
proceeding against a third party-a garnishee-who owes a debt to the
debtor or is in lawful possession of the debtor's property. 98 Garnishment
proceedings are an entirely new suit-or, a "lawsuit within a lawsuit." 99 In
that sense, garnishments are a type of attachment, 10 0 which may be brought
wherever the property of the debtor is found, regardless of the connection,
if
10 1
any, between the underlying action, the debtor, and the forum state.
The parties in Koehler disagreed as to whether garnishment proceedings
require in personam or in rem jurisdiction. 10 2 Some courts have considered
garnishments to require in rem jurisdiction. 10 3 Some courts have defined
postjudgment garnishment proceedings as a cross between in personam and
in rem. 104 At least one court has described such proceedings to be "the
nature of a proceeding in rem although it moves against a garnishee in
personam."10 5 Accordingly, not only must the garnishee06be within the
jurisdiction of the enforcing court but so must the property.1

allow his bank accounts to be restrained. The debtor should be presumed to actively engage
in tactics designed to conceal his assets.").
98. See SILBERMAN, ET AL., supra note 14, at 802; Laurence, supra note 79, at 356-57
("[G]amishment may issue upon anyone owing money to or having possession of the
defendant's property."). Determining who a proper garnishee is, however, may not always
be so simple. For a further explanation, see New York Practice, supra note 79, § 491.
Additionally, choosing the proper garnishee may depend upon which assets of the judgment
debtor the garnishee holds, as not all assets or property are subject to garnishment. See id.
§§ 486-487, 490.
99. Bianco v. Concepts "100", Inc., 436 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (quoting 9
GOODR.ICH AMRAM 2d § 3144(a): 1 (1977)).
100. Nat'l Bank of Wilmington & Brandywine v. Furtick, 42 A. 479, 481 (Del. 1897).
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 481 cmt. h (1987). This is, in some sense, what Shaffer's footnote thirty-six seems to say.
See supra notes 81-83.
102. See infra notes 148, 179-81 and accompanying text.
103. See Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 95 A.2d 273, 279 (Md. 1953); Grissum v.
Soldi, 108 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ("[G]arnishment is a proceeding in rem that
brings within the jurisdiction and power of the trial court a debt ... i.e., a 'res,' ....
" (citing
Antonacci v. Antonacci, 892 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995))).
104. See Bianco, 436 A.2d at 209 ("'It is true that the attachment process i[s] a
proceeding in rem, but it is equally true that it is something more. It is also a proceeding
against the garnishee personally .... The summons, the judgment, and execution contain

the bones and sinews of a proceeding in personam against the garnishee."' (quoting
Breading v. Siegworth, 29 Pa. (5 Casey) 396, 399 (1857))). In a way, the court noted, they
are "a species of in personam actions." Id.; see also APR Energy, LLC v. Pak. Power Res.,
LLC, No. 3:08-cv-961-J-25MCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17194, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20,
2009).
105. Robbins, Coe, Rubinstein & Shafran, Ltd. v. Ro Tek, Inc., 320 N.E.2d 157, 161 (I11.
App. Ct. 1974) (citations omitted).
106. Id. But see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
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C. Prejudgmentvs. Postjudgment: Some Obvious and Not-So-Obvious
Differences
In Koehler, the parties disputed the extent, if any, to which typical
107
prejudgment due process concerns exist in postjudgment proceedings.
This is an incredibly important disagreement.
For example, if the
enforcement of a judgment requires that the judgment debtor be afforded
typical prejudgment due process protections, it would hardly seem fair to
allow a Bermuda resident's stock certificates, located in a Bermuda bank, to
be garnished by a Maryland creditor in New York. Put more simply, if due
process considerations as to the judgment debtor restrict postjudgment
garnishments, the Koehler decision may very well be unconstitutional.10 8
Judge William Houston Brown has noted that "there are some obvious
differences between postjudgment and prejudgment garnishment."' 1 9 To
begin, as one court has vaguely stated, jurisdiction in postjudgment
proceedings is "wider." 110 This should, however, be rather obvious: a
court's role differs significantly depending upon whether a valid judgment
already exists. 111 In such cases, the court is then only being asked to
enforce the judgment, rather than to determine whether or not the defendant
has in some way wronged the plaintiff. 112 Accordingly, "the procedural
impediments faced by a creditor seeking prejudgment garnishment of the
113
debtor's property or debts are in large part removed.'
This was the case in Koehler. The validity of the judgment against the
judgment debtor was not at issue. 114 Instead, the judgment creditor was
merely asking the court to assist him in satisfying his judgment. 115 Thus,
the role of the court is one way in which there is an obvious difference
between prejudgment and postjudgment proceedings.

107. See infra notes 162-68, 187-90 and accompanying text.

108. This is because the judgment debtor and his property likely did not meet the
minimum contacts requirements of prejudgment due process analysis. See generally Part
I.A. 1-2. This was the argument made by the dissent in Koehler. See infra notes 213-28 and
accompanying text.
109. 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:55, at 6-145
to -146 (rev. ed. 2002).
110. Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 884 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003) (noting that such a rationale was in "no doubt drawn" from Shaffer's footnote thirtysix).
t11.
See Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent Theory of In
Personam Jurisdiction,43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97, 114-115 (1992).

112. Id. at 115.
113. 1 BROWN, supra note 109, § 6.55, at 6-146 (citing Schneidler v. Feeder's Grain &
Supply, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)). Accordingly, "the judgment creditor
basically needs only to establish the existence of an unsatisfied judgment and the reasonable
belief that a third party possesses assets of the judgment debtor or owes a debt to the
judgment debtor." Id. (citing Dunn v. Bemor Petrol., 737 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)).
114. See Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009).
115. See generally id.
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Another-and perhaps more important-distinction, however, may not
be so obvious. It is not clear whether in postjudgment garnishment
proceedings the enforcing court's jurisdiction must comport with the typical
prejudgment due process analysis. Shaffer's footnote thirty-six seems to
indicate that, at the very least, due process considerations are somewhat
different postjudgment. 116 Another earlier Supreme Court case also seems
to demonstrate this. 117 However, at least one court has considered it
necessary to analyze a non resident judgment debtor's contacts with the
enforcing state before permitting a garnishment. "1 8 This approach has
garnered the support of at least one commentator. 119 Some courts and
commentators, on the other hand, have explicitly opposed the use of a due
process inquiry in postjudgment garnishment proceedings. 120 New York
has adopted this approach with respect to foreign-country money

116. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
117. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 288-90
(1924) (noting that due process does not require that a judgment debtor be given notice and
the opportunity to be heard before a garnishment may proceed against his assets). For a
thorough discussion regarding the treatment of the Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, Inc. decision and the subsequent judicial treatment of postjudgment garnishment
constitutional concerns, see Diana Gribbon Motz & Andrew H. Baida, The Due Process
Rights of PostjudgmentDebtors and Child Support Obligors, 45 MD. L. REv. 61 (1986); see
also Thomas W. Logue, Note, Due Process, Postudgment Garnishment, and 'BrutalNeed'
Exemptions, 1982 DUKE L.J. 192 (discussing the judicial treatment of postjudgment
garnishment notice requirements).
118. See Fraser v. Littlejohn, 386 S.E.2d 230, 234-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (applying the
InternationalShoe minimum contacts analysis to a postjudgment garnishment proceeding).
119. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 372 ("'Fair play and substantial justice' should
function as the hallmark of postjudgment enforcement process .... "). Therefore, the author
noted, "a garnishment is only proper in a jurisdiction which has the constitutionally
minimum contacts with both the garnishee and the defendant." Id. at 370. The author also
notes that while requiring a due process inquiry for postjudgment proceedings would be
"cumbersome," it would limit the amount of forum shopping. Id. at 381.
120. See Smith v. Lorillard, Inc., 945 F.2d 745, 746 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Shaffer sets limits
only on the original assertion of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants, not on the imposition of an ancillary order of garnishment flowing from a
judgment .... ."); Huggins v. Deinhard, 654 P.2d 32, 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)
(distinguishing Shaffer as applicable only to prejudgment cases); Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Ark. 1987) (noting that the due process
minimum contacts analysis is not required for postjudgment collection proceedings (citing
Oregon ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. Control Data Corp., 713 P.2d 30, 32 (Or. 1986))); Bank
of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 23 (Conn. 1984) (citing to footnote thirty-six and noting
that no minimum contacts analysis is required postjudgment); Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d
557, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Hexter v. Hexter, 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007-08
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Cappalli, supra, note 111, at 115 ("The executing court should
not do a full contacts probe because that body is exercising such limited power against the
judgment debtor. That court is not assessing liability and measuring compensation but
merely making property available to satisfy the liquidated claim."); Vernon, supra note 24,
at 1008 ("The exemption of proceedings to realize on judgments from the minimum contacts
standard of International Shoe is pragmatically necessary if judgment debtors are to be
prevented from shielding their assets from judgment creditors by shipping the assets to a
state with which the underlying litigation had no prior connection.").
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judgments. 121 Accordingly, one commentator argues that the Shaffer Court
had a "very different view of what is 'fair' in postjudgment attachment
actions and 'greatly relaxed' the minimum contacts requirement in such
actions." 122 The author then argues that the proper analysis for an
enforcing court is a "rear view mirror" test to determine if the rendering
defendant. 123 If so, no further inquiry
court had proper jurisdiction over the
24
1
court.
enforcing
the
by
is required
How, if at all, the Shaffer opinion may change postjudgment garnishment
analysis has yet to be fully realized. This is, in part, because enforcement
125
proceedings do not garner much attention in the legal community.
Instead, and perhaps understandably, most attention is focused on the
of
events leading up to the judgment. 126 This has led to a degree 127
uncertainty regarding the proper analysis of these proceedings.
Moreover, this uncertainty is perhaps fitting with the continuously evolving
fabric of jurisdictional analysis. For, as Justice Scalia has stated, "This
28
American jurisdictional practice is ...not merely old; it is continuing."1
II. KOEHLER v. BANK OF BERMUDA: A CASE ANALYSIS

As seen, states have disagreed as to whether postjudgment garnishment
proceedings require in rem or in personam jurisdiction. 12 9 Courts have also
disagreed as to whether or not the due process considerations which exist
121. See, e.g., Lenchyshyn v.Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2001)
(noting that "neither the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution nor New York
law requires" a New York court have jurisdiction over the judgment debtor before
recognizing and enforcing the judgment against him). Such a holding, the Lenchyshyn v.
Pelko Electric, Inc. court noted, was dictated by "[c]onsiderations of logic, fairness, and
practicality." Id. at 291. Requiring the judgment debtor be subject to the enforcing state's
jurisdiction, the court continued, "would unduly protect a judgment debtor and enable him
easily to escape his just obligations." Id. at 292; see also supra note 97; infra notes 169-73,
259 and accompanying text.
122. Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 81, at 31 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n. 14 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
123. Id.
124. The author continues to argue that if the rendering court had proper jurisdiction over
the defendant, "all that is needed in the enforcing state is the presence of defendant's assets."
Id. Thus, although the author argued that a due process inquiry is not necessary
postjudgment, the presence of the judgment debtor's assets within the forum is. Presumably
then, Diaz-Pedrosa would disagree with the New York court's decision in Koehler. This is
supported by the author's later point that a court enforcing a foreign arbitral award must
have "'something' within its jurisdiction ... to satisfy the award." Id. at 41 (citing Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980)).
125. Newman, supra note 92.
126. Id.
127. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 383 ("All the parameters of postjudgment due
process analysis-including precisely where the garnishment of an intangible asset must
occur-are yet to be worked out and, given Shaffer's footnote 36, it may be a while before
they are.").
128. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990).
129. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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prejudgment are also relevant postjudgment. 130 However, even authorities
that do not require a minimum contacts inquiry postjudgment have seemed
to require, at least by implication, that the property to be garnished be
within the garnishing jurisdiction.' 3 1 Nonetheless, in Koehler, the New
York Court of Appeals perhaps paved its own course by holding that a court
with jurisdiction over a garnishee but not the judgment debtor may order
the garnishee to transfer extraterritorial assets in its possession into the
state. 132 Such a holding raises serious due process and policy concerns. 133
A better understanding of both the reasoning of the Koehler decision, as
well as its potential impact, demands a closer look at the case itself. Part
II.A details the factual and procedural background of the case. Part II.B. 1
explores the arguments put forth by judgment creditor Lee N. Koehler in his
briefs. Part II.B.2 explores the arguments put forth in the Bank of
Bermuda's briefs. Part II.C discusses the court's majority decision and Part
II.D discusses the dissenting opinion.
A. Statement of the Case
Although the Koehler case was decided by the New York Court of
Appeals in June of 2009, the events comprising the facts of the decision
actually began almost sixteen years earlier. In 1993, Koehler, a citizen of
130. See supra notes 81-83, 116-24 and accompanying text.
131. See Huggins v. Deinhard, 654 P.2d 32, 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (noting there is "no
unfairness in allowing appellee to realize on that debt in Arizona where appellant has
property"); 30 AM. JuR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 572 (2005)
("Judgment creditors seeking examination in aid of attachment are generally limited to
property within the situs jurisdiction, since a state has no power to reach property beyond its
borders." (citing Pac. Decision Sci. Corp. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 109 (Ct.
App. 2004))); Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 81, at 31. Even New York, in Lenchyshyn, implied
that the property to satisfy the judgment must be present within the state. See Lenchyshyn v.
Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (App. Div. 2001) ("[E]ven if defendants do not
presently have assets in New York, plaintiffs nevertheless should be granted recognition of
the . . . money judgment

. . .

and thereby should have the opportunity to pursue all such

enforcement steps infuturo, whenever it might appear that defendants are maintaining assets
in New York .... "). Such language seems to imply that the judgment-creditors could
register their judgment against the debtor in New York, but could not act on it until some
property of the debtor was within the state. See id.; see also Mones v. Commercial Bank of
Kuwait, S.A.K., 399 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that "[c]ourts have
repeatedly held ... that [CPLR 5225's] power is limited to ordering the delivery of property
that is located within the court's jurisdiction"), vacated on other grounds, 204 F. App'x 988
(2d Cir. 2006). This, after all, is the language of Shaffer's footnote thirty-six. See supra note
81 and accompanying text (noting that the judgment may be enforced wherever the judgment
debtor "has property").
132. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 827 (N.Y. 2009).
133. See, e.g., Daniel L. Brown & Elizabeth M. Rotenberg-Schwartz, Judgment Secured:
Now What? 'Koehler' Provides Greater New York State Access to Banks for Collection,
N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2009, at S8 (noting that the ramifications of the decision are "potentially
staggering"); Siegel, supra note 7, at 9 (asking if the decision will hurt New York by
"prompting garnishees like banks, indulgent of their customers ... to stay out of New York
entirely").
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Maryland, won a default judgment in a Maryland court against A. David
Dodwell, a resident of Bermuda. 134 At the time, Dodwell owned shares of a
Bermuda company's stock, which he deposited in a Bank of Bermuda
135
branch in Bermuda.
In that same year, Koehler registered his Maryland judgment in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 136 Shortly thereafter,
Koehler began a garnishment proceeding by serving a writ of execution
upon the Bank of Bermuda (New York) Limited (the Bank), the Bank's
New York subsidiary. 137 Specifically, Koehler filed a petition for the
"payment or delivery of property of judgment debtor" pursuant to New
York's Civil Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR). 138 CPLR fifty-two permits
a judgment creditor to obtain satisfaction of his or her judgment against
either the judgment debtor or a garnishee of the judgment debtor. 13 9 After

134. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., Nos. M18-302, 931745, 2002 WL 519740, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2002). Although immaterial to this Comment's discussion, Lee N.
Koehler's actual state of residency is not entirely clear. Although the lower court listed
Koehler as a resident of Maryland, see id., the New York Court of Appeals listed Koehler as
a resident of Pennsylvania. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827.
135. Koehler, 2002 WL 519740, at *1. The parties in Koehler did not dispute that the
certificates were physically located in Bermuda, not New York. Id. This seems to be in
accord with New York law. See Dyer v. Dyer, 247 N.Y.S. 540, 541-42 (App. Div. 1931)
(noting that "[s]hares owned by a nonresident defendant in a foreign corporation are not
property within the state of New York, even though the corporation be doing business here,
unless the stock certificates themselves are found within the state").
136. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827. A federal statute permits the registration of a valid
judgment in another district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
137. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827.
138. Id. Postjudgment execution proceedings in federal court are governed by the
procedural law of the state in which the federal court is located. See FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
139. New York's C.P.L.R. 5225 says, in part,
(a) Property in the possession of judgment debtor. Upon motion of the
judgment creditor, upon notice to the judgment debtor, where it is shown that the
judgment debtor is in possession or custody of money or other personal property in
which he has an interest, the court shall order that the judgment debtor pay the
money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the judgment
creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, to
deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of sufficient value to
satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff....
(b) Property not in the possession of judgment debtor. Upon a special
proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor, against a person in possession or
custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an
interest, or against a person who is a transferee of money or other personal
property from the judgment debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is
entitled to the possession of such property or that the judgment creditor's rights to
the property are superior to those of the transferee, the court shall require such
person to pay the money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment,
to the judgment creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to satisfy
the judgment, to deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of
sufficient value to satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225 (McKinney 1997).
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much litigation, the Bank
eventually consented to the personal jurisdiction
140
of New York's courts.
In 1993, the district court issued an order that directed the Bank to turn
over the stock certificates in Bermuda to Koehler.14 1 However, in 2005, the
district court dismissed Koehler's petition, basing its decision upon the
"crucial fact" that the stock certificates were located outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction, and reasoning that New York could not attach
property located outside the state. 142 Accordingly, the court found that it
43
lacked jurisdiction over the judgment debtor's stock certificates.
144
Koehler appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which observed that it was unclear whether or not New York was permitted
to order a garnishee subject to its jurisdiction to deliver assets that are in its
possession but not located in New York. 14 5 Although it perceived that
nothing in the statutory text would prohibit such an order, 146 the court, by
certified question, asked the New York Court of Appeals to determine
"whether a court sitting in New York may ... order a bank over which it
has personal jurisdiction to deliver stock certificates owned by a judgment
debtor (or cash equal to their value) to a judgment creditor ...when those
1 47
stock certificates are located outside New York."
The next section will examine the arguments made by the parties in their
respective briefs.
B. Arguments from the Briefs
1. Koehler
In his brief, Koehler pointed to several cases and commentaries
interpreting section 5225(a) for support of the proposition that garnishment
proceedings are proceedings in personam, requiring only jurisdiction over

140. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827. The parties had litigated the issue for nearly ten years.
Id.
141. See Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., No. M18-302 (CSH), 2005 WL 551115, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005), vacated, 577 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2009).

142. Id. at *1, *11.
143. Id. at *7.
144. See Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 544 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2008).

145. Id. at 85-86 ("It seems clear that a court sitting in New York, that has personal
jurisdiction over a judgment debtor, may order the judgment debtor himself to deliver
property into New York. It is less clear that courts have the authority to order a person or
entity other than the judgment debtor to deliver assets into New York, when that person or
entity is located in a foreign jurisdiction." (citing Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l
Fin. Co., B.V., 836 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (App. Div. 2007); Starbare II Partners, L.P. v. Sloan, 629
N.Y.S.2d 23 (App. Div. 1995))).

146. See id. at 86 ("[W]e see no principled reason why a court in New York should not be
able to order a garnishee that has submitted to its personal jurisdiction to deliver property
within its control.").
147. Id. at 87.
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the person-that is, the garnishee. 14 8 Furthermore, Koehler noted, it was
established law that judgment debtors may be ordered to turn over out-ofstate property. 149 For example, in Miller v. Doniger,150 the judgment debtor
maintained several bank accounts outside the state of New York. 151
Despite the fact that some of the accounts were in the possession of
relatives, the court ordered that they be transferred into the state in order to
satisfy the existing judgment. 152 More importantly, however, Koehler
pointed to the decision in Morgenthau v. Avion Resources Ltd. 153 In
Morgenthau, the court noted, although in dicta, that garnishees could be
ordered to transfer assets in their possession into the state. 154
Although these decisions all involved the court's power over a judgment
debtor, not a garnishee, Koehler argued that such a distinction was
inappropriate. 155 For support, Koehler asserted that nothing in section
5225(b) prohibits a court from reaching property located outside the
state. 156 Moreover, looking at the language of the CPLR statute, Koehler
148. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler at 12-13, Koehler v. Bank of
Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 05-2378).
149. Id. This was not disputed by the Bank. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 830. This,
Koehler argued, was the court's decision in Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l Finance
Co., B. V. See Gryphon, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (noting that a "court could order the defendant
judgment debtor to turn over property because it had personal jurisdiction over [him]" (citing
StarbareII, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 23)); see also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378 (1965); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that, in a
bankruptcy proceeding, a court may order defendant "and all persons holding property for
her" to transfer the property into the state); Lozano v. Lozano, 975 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.
1998) (upholding lower court's order that judgment debtor turn over property located in
Mexico). These holdings flow from the general rule that a court has the power to order a
person subject to its jurisdiction to obey its orders, even if that requires the performance of
an act in another jurisdiction. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144
(N.D. I11.1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971)); Gresov
v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 215 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("Where jurisdiction
of the parties is assumed, this court may render an injunctive decree having extraterritorial
effect in appropriate circumstances." (citing Newmark v. C & C Super Corp., 3 A.D.2d 823
(N.Y. App. Div. 1957))).
150. 814 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 2006).
151. Id. at 141.
152. Id. In its brief, the Bank asserted that Miller v. Doniger should not be interpreted to
mean that relatives were third-party garnishees. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda
Ltd. at 24, Koehler, 911 N.E.2d 825 (No. 05-2378-cv). In Miller, the Bank argued, the court
treated the debtor's relatives as his "alter ego." Id.
153. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 13 (citing
Morgenthau v. Avion Resourccs Ltd., 849 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (App. Div. 2007)).
154. Morgenthau, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 226 (noting that the "plaintiff correctly notes that the
New York courts have the power to command a garnishee present in the state to bring outof-state assets under the garnishee's control into the state" (citing Gryphon Dom. VI, LLC,
836 N.Y.S.2d 4; Miller, 814 N.Y.S.2d 141; Starbare II Partners, L.P. v. Sloan, 629 N.Y.S.2d
23 (App. Div. 1995))).
155. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 18 (noting that
this was a "distinction without a difference").
156. Id. at 11; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 1997). The location of the
property, Koehler asserted, is "ultimately immaterial." Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N.
Koehler, supra note 148, at 11. Moreover, Koehler argued, it would be wrong to presume
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noted that section 5225(a), dealing with judgment debtors, is "identical" to
section 5225(b), dealing with garnishees. 157 The only distinction, Koehler
asserted, is that section (a) proceeds by motion whereas section (b) requires
a special proceeding to establish jurisdiction over the garnishee. 158 Other
than that, Koehler noted, the operational language is the same. 159 Thus, if it
was well-established that judgment debtors could be ordered to turn over
out-of-state property,160 so too could garnishees. 161
Citing to Shaffer's footnote thirty-six, 162 Koehler noted that "there is an
important distinction between pre-judgment attachment and post-judgment
collection proceedings." 163 As an example, Koehler pointed to the court's
decision in Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric, Inc.,164 which held that an

that the statute has "certain premises, presuppositions, or postulates, which are not
articulated anywhere in the statute." Appellant's Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Clearing House Association L.L.C. at 9, Koehler, 911 N.E.2d 825 (No. 05-2378).
157. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 16-17; see also
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b).
158. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 16-17; see also
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b); NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 510 ("If a third person
(garnishee) has it, a special proceeding is used; if the judgment debtor has it, motion practice
is used.").
159. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 16-17.
160. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
161. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 18-19 ("As a
general principle of statutory construction, 'whenever a word is used in a statute in one sense
and with one meaning, and subsequently the same word is used in a statute on the same
subject matter, it is understood as having been used in the same sense."' (quoting Riley v.
County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 104 (N.Y. 2000))). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, before certifying the question to the New York court, also endorsed this
argument. See Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 544 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover,
Koehler argued, this would merely reflect the theory that a garnishee in such proceedings
"stands-in-the-shoes" of the judgment debtor. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N.
Koehler at 19, Koehler, 911 N.E.2d 533 (No. 05-2378). Professor David Siegel has
explained this theory as permitting courts to find the assets' situs wherever the garnishee is
located. See NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 491 ("Finding the garnishee is just
another way of finding the asset's 'situs': if the garnishee has a New York presence, the
debtor's asset in the garnishee's hands will usually be found to have a New York situs,
too."). If this were so, the Koehler court could have relied upon this theory to explain that
the debtor's assets were really located-with the garnishee-in New York. This perhaps
would have simplified the reasoning and allowed the court to resolve the issue without really
addressing it directly. This reasoning, however, mirrors the outmoded "debt-follows-thedebtor" theory of Harris v. Balk. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. While
some courts have suggested that Harris's "debt-follows-the-debtor" theory still applies
postjudgment, see supra note 79, this raises some serious practical concerns. See Laurence
supra note 79, at 375, 383-84 (noting that such a rationale would essentially create a situs
for such debts anywhere the garnishee is present and impose serious practical complications
for nationally operating entities).
162. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
163. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 9; see also
supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
164. 723 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2001).
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enforcing court need not have jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. 165
Accordingly, Koehler argued, the Bank could not rely upon prejudgment
cases to support its proposition that the debtor, or his property, must be
within the garnishing jurisdiction. 166 Thus, Koehler noted, applying
Shaffer's decision to postjudgment garnishments would be contradictory:
CPLR, 167 but it
not only would it conflict with the statutory language of the
68
would also directly contradict the holding in Lenchyshyn. 1
Koehler also cited several policy considerations in support of permitting
such garnishments. First, Koehler noted, requiring that the judgment
debtor's property be located within the enforcing state would merely permit
the debtor to evade the enforcement of the judgment. 169 All the debtor
would need to do is move his property to a state other than the one being
asked to enforce the judgment. 170 This would impede the courts' desires to
see that all valid judgments are enforced. 17 1 Also, Koehler argued, courts
should automatically favor the interests of the judgment creditor over the
that the
judgment debtor. 172 After all, a court has already determined
173
judgment debtor has in some way harmed the judgment creditor.
165. See id. at 289 (listing over a dozen court decisions nationwide and noting that these
courts "have cited the Shaffer footnote [and] have held uniformly that no jurisdictional basis
for proceeding against the judgment debtor need be shown before a foreign judgment will be
recognized or enforced in a given state"); see also supra notes 120-24.
166. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 10-11
(distinguishing cases relied upon by the Bank as addressing prejudgment attachments).
167. See supra note 139.
168. Appellant's Reply to Amicus CuriaeBrief of the Clearing House Association L.L.C.,
supra note 156, at 24.
169. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 19; see also
Vernon, supra note 24, at 1008.
170. This concern seems to be in accord with what courts have understood the Shaffer
opinion to prevent in the prejudgment context. See, e.g., Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Byrens, Civ.
No. 02CV449-J (AJB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26719, at *13 (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2003)
("The due process requirements are not aimed at helping a defendant escape enforcement of
a judgment if that defendant, for example, removes the subject property to a forum that does
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant." (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
210 (1977))). Such evasive maneuvers by the judgment debtor, we may assume, are likely.
See Rakowski, supra note 97.
171. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 24-25
(noting that "[e]very court has an interest in the enforcement of its judgments" and that
"[r]ules or requirements that create impediments to the enforcement of judgments should be
carefully examined"); see also Fraser v. Littlejohn, 386 S.E.2d 230, 237 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989) ("[The state] has an interest in assisting out-of-state creditors who seek to collect from
debtors who come within the reach of our courts. No state benefits when debtors are
allowed to escape their financial obligations."); NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 491
(noting that a "construction that aids enforcement should, as between competing
possibilities, be the one selected").
172. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 25. As one
commentator has argued, to the extent that "fairness" matters in the postjudgment context, it
should be "fairness to the garnishee, not the defendant." John T. Hundley, Long Arms and
Foreign Pockets: Can Multinational FinancialOrganizations Be Used To Subject Alien
Defendants to the Enforcement of Illinois Judgments?, CHI. B. Ass'N REc., Sept. 1990, at 24,
27. Moreover, Hundley argues, "the traditional fairness analysis does not apply because the
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Nor, Koehler argued, would an order requiring the Bank to turn over the
assets located in another territory "violate the sovereignty" of that
territory. 174 While a prejudgment attachment would require a New York
sheriff to enter the other state and secure the property, a clear violation of
state sovereignty, 17 5 turnover orders merely act against the garnishee who is
already present within New York and subject to its jurisdiction.' 76 The
court would only be ordering the garnishee, over which it already has
jurisdiction, to bring property in the garnishee's possession into the state. 177
And, as a result of its "presence" within New York, Koehler argued, the
Bank was legally obligated to obey the turnover order. 178
2. The Bank
The Bank asserted that garnishment proceedings are "'in the nature of
actions in rem, and are especially so when they proceed without jurisdiction
of the person of the debtor.""' 179 Furthermore, the Bank asserted, it was
well-established law in New York that in prejudgment attachment
proceedings the property must be within the jurisdiction of the court. 180
Thus, the Bank asserted, the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the
judgment because it lacked jurisdiction over the assets.'l 8 Moreover, the

post-judgment action cannot be intended to force the defendant to litigate the original
lawsuit; there already is a judgment." Id.
173. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 25-26.
And, Koehler argued, "having been already afforded a judicial hearing on the merits and lost
.. . no further process is due." Appellant's Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Clearing
House Association L.L.C., supra note 156, at 49-50.
174. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 20 (quoting
Gryphon v. Dom. VI, LLC v. APP Intern Fin. Co., B.V., 41 A.D.3d 25, 31 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007)); see also supra note 23.
175. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 20 (quoting
Gryphon, 41 A.D.3d at 31).
176. Id.
177. Id. Accordingly, Koehler argued, there is no reason to imply a geographic limitation
on the statutory language. Appellant's Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Clearing House
Association L.L.C., supra note 156, at 10.
178. Appellant's Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Clearing House Association L.L.C.,
supra note 156, at 25; see also supra note 149.
179. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 11 (quoting Nat'l
Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N.Y. 213, 222 (1904)) (citing Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC
v. Falor, Nos. 601175/07, 4043N, 4043NA, 4043NB, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9466, at
*5 (App. Div. Dec. 16, 2008)).
180. Id. at 13 (quoting Nat'l Broadway Bank, 179 N.Y. at 222); see also Capital Distrib.
Servs., Ltd. v. Ducor Express Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(noting that the court knew of no authority "that supports a court's power to attach property
that lies outside of its territorial jurisdiction"); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 67 (1971) ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to apply to the
satisfaction of a claim a chattel belonging to the person against whom the claim is asserted,
but which is in the possession or control of another person, if... (b) the chattel to be applied
is within the state.").
181. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 12-13.
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Bank asserted, the cases cited by Koehler in support of its position 182 were

3
inapposite because they dealt with judgment debtors, not garnishees.18
Nor, the Bank asserted, did anything in the language of the CPLR statute
indicate that it was intended to have extraterritorial reach. 184 In fact, canons
of construction would indicate that no such language should be read into the
statute. 185 Simply, if the legislature had intended section 5225(b) to have
186
extraterritorial reach it would have added such language to the statute.
Permitting such garnishments, the Bank also warned, would raise serious
due process concerns. 187 Specifically, the Bank cited to the Supreme
Court's decisions in both InternationalShoe and Shaffer. 188 In these cases,
the Bank noted, the Supreme Court had made it clear that all exercises of
judicial jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum contacts test.18 9 The facts,
the Bank argued, proved that New York's contacts with this matter were
"weak, at best.' 9 0
Lastly, allowing the garnishment of out-of-state property would create
serious policy implications. 19 1 Particularly, the Bank cautioned, any
financial property held by banks worldwide would be vulnerable to
garnishment in New York if that bank had a branch or subsidiary in the

182. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
183. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 22-23 ("The
fundamental flaw of Koehler's argument is that it fails to recognize the distinction between
the broad, plenary power a court has when the judgment debtor is subject to personal
jurisdiction, as compared to the more limited power it has in a special proceeding to garnish
property.").
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id. at 16-17 ("'An intention of making an innovation in a long established rule of
law is not imputed to the Legislature in the absence of a clear manifestation of such
intention. This rule has ever greater validity in cases where ... jurisdictional questions are
concerned."' (quoting N.Y. STAT. LAW § 153 (1971))); see also Phillips v. Consol. Supply
Co., 895 P.2d 574, 577 (Idaho 1995) ("Absent a statute granting extraterritorial rights,
'[s]tatutes are intended to apply and be confined in their operation to persons, property and
rights which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the law-making power."' (quoting OreIda Potato Prods., Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 392 P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1964))).
186. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 17 n.5.
Interestingly, the Koehler majority implied the exact opposite. See infra notes 204-05 and
accompanying text. The Bank's argument, however, is not entirely without merit. For a
similar argument made successfully, see Desert Wide Cabling & Installation, Inc. v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 958 P.2d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to give garnishment statute
extraterritorial effect, assuming legislature would have done so if intended).
187. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 28.
188. Id.; see also supra notes 29-49, 69-80 and accompanying text.
189. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 28; see also
supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
190. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 28. This
argument, however, ignores the Shaffer Court's clarification in footnote thirty-six, which
arguably removes due process considerations from postjudgment proceedings. See supra
notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
191. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 35.
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state. 192 Secondly, such garnishments may harm other creditors of the
judgment debtor who may have claims to the same property. 193 Lastly,
permitting such garnishments would create significant burdens on the
courts. 194 Specifically, courts would have to undergo a costly and timeof considerations regarding due process and state
consuming analysis
95
1
sovereignty.
C. The Koehler Decision
On June 4th, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals, split four to three,
answered the certified question before it in the affirmative.1 96 The Bank, as
garnishee, could be ordered to transfer the property from Bermuda into New
97

York. 1

The Court began its analysis by distinguishing prejudgment attachment
proceedings from postjudgment enforcement proceedings.19 8 Prejudgment
attachments, the court noted, require jurisdiction over the property. 199
Postjudgment attachments, on the other hand, are proceedings in personam

192. Id. at 35-36. This point was strongly reiterated by the Clearing House Association
in an amicus brief in support of the Bank. See Brief of the Clearing House Association
L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22-24, Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd.,
911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 05-2378-cv) (noting that such garnishments would deter
"foreign customers who do not wish their assets to be exposed in New York" and "would
further increase the pressure on ... banks not to operate in the State"). The Clearing House
also expressed concern that such garnishments would create "a rush on the New York courts
to obtain such orders," essentially flooding the courts "with proceedings arising from
controversies and debts that have nothing to do with New York." Id. at 26. Forum shopping
would be even more likely, Clearing House asserted, because allowing such garnishments
would create a serious conflict with decisions in several other states. See id. at 27-28 & n. 15.
These concerns have been recognized in recent commentaries on the case. See Brown &
Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7.
193. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 36; see also NEW
YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 485 ("A judgment creditor may find that she is not alone in
pursuit of the debtor, who may be in such financial extremis that his creditors are legion. At
this point the topic becomes what law school curricula often denominated 'creditors' rights',
a battleground that determines priorities in the assets of a declining debtor.").
194. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 37. This
decision perhaps comes at a troubling time, as a recent article has highlighted the fact that
New York courts ended 2009 with the highest number of cases ever. See William Glaberson,
The Recession Begins Floodinginto the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at Al.
195. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 37. This concern
has been addressed by at least one commentator. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 381 (noting
that "[rjeversing footnote 36 to require a due process inquiry" postjudgment would be
"cumbersome," but supporting the idea regardless). For arguments against requiring such
due process analysis postjudgment, see Cappalli, supra note 111, at 114-15; Vernon, supra
note 24, at 1007-8.
196. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 828-29.
199. Id. at 829 ("'[I]t is a fundamental rule that in attachment proceedings the res must be
within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the process, in order to confer jurisdiction."'
(quoting Nat'l Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 71 N.E. 766, 769 (N.Y. 1904))).
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and thus only require jurisdiction over the person. 200 Once jurisdiction has
been established over the person, the court explained, it may order the
20 1
adherence to its orders by proceeding in personam against the person.
Accordingly, since the Bank had consented to the jurisdiction of the
203
court, 202 that was all that was necessary to order it to turn over the assets.
Turning to the CPLR statute, the court noted that section fifty-two
"contains no express territorial limitation barring the entry of a turnover
order that requires a garnishee to transfer money or property into New
York. '20 4 It would be improper to read such a restriction into the statutory
language, the court noted, because it would have been "easy" for the
20 5
legislature to have added such a restriction into the statutory language.
The majority then proceeded to address the alleged distinction between
garnishees and judgment debtors. The court acknowledged the settled rule
that judgment debtors may be ordered to bring their out-of-state assets into
the state. 206 The court then dismissed the Bank's assertion that, absent
jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, courts are limited by their in rem
jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 20 7 Nothing in the CPLR statute, the
court explained, supported such a proposition. 20 8 In fact, the court noted,
the statute contemplates, in identical language, that a defendant subject to
the court's jurisdiction-regardless of whether he is a judgment debtor or
20 9
garnishee-could be ordered to turn over property.

200. Id. (stating that "article 52 postjudgment enforcement involves a proceeding against
a person-its purpose is to demand that a person convert property to money for payment to a
creditor").
201. Id. (citing Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, N.Y., 138 N.Y. 209, 219

(1893)).
202. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 149.
204. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 829.
205. Id. For support, the court pointed to a recent amendment to section 5224 of the
CPLR that gave it extraterritorial reach. Id. The court saw this as support for the proposition
that the remainder of section fifty-two was intended to have the same extraterritorial effect.
Id. Interestingly, however, the majority failed to recognize, and the dissent failed to argue,
that this recent amendment may indicate that the legislature purposely left the language of
5225 as is because it did not wish for it to have any extraterritorial reach. Similarly, just as a
limitation could not be read into the statute, the majority ignores the fact that such an
expansion could not either.
206. Id. at 830; see also supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
207. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 830.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 830-31; see also supra note 139. The majority in Koehler did not really
address the jurisdictional due process concerns fervently debated by the parties. In fact, the
majority's only reference to such concerns was merely in dictum, noting that the Shaffer
decision only restricts prejudgment jurisdictional exercise. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 82829.
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D. The Dissent
In a strong dissent, three judges expressed concern over the majority's
expansive interpretation. 2 10 Such a reading, the dissent warned, "is
unsupported by any precedent in New York or, apparently, in any other
jurisdiction." 2 11 Perhaps even more importantly, the dissent noted, the
majority decision's "policy implications are troubling, and ... may well be
2 12

unconstitutional.
The dissent expressed concern that the majority's interpretation of the
garnishment statute may exceed the State's jurisdictional powers as limited
by the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. 2 13 Particularly, the
dissent relied upon the holdings in InternationalShoe and Shaffer.2 14 The
dissent pointed to Shaffer's footnote thirty-six as indication that
postjudgment garnishments focus on the location of the property, and thus
are proceedings in rem. 215 Although the dissenters conceded that the
Supreme Court has never applied International Shoe to postjudgment
proceedings, 2 16 they argued that the majority's approach might very well
2 17
fail the standard set forth in InternationalShoe.
For support, the dissenters pointed to the recent decision by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in Livingston v. Naylor.218 In Livingston, the
judgment creditor had obtained a money judgment against the judgment
debtor, a resident of North Carolina, in a North Carolina court. 2 19 The
judgment debtor had been employed by Marriott Hotels in both North
Carolina and Maryland. 220 After enrolling his judgment in Maryland, the
judgment creditor sought to garnish the wages of the debtor in Maryland by
garnishing the Marriott Hotel there. 2 21 The Livingston court first dismissed
the judgment debtor's claim that the court lacked power to issue the
garnishment because it lacked jurisdiction over him. 222 Thus, the court

210. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 833; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 29-49, 69-80 and accompanying text.
215. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 833.
216. Id. In fact, courts and commentators have supported the notion that International
Shoe's minimum contacts analysis does not apply to postjudgment proceedings. See supra
notes 82-83, 120-24 and accompanying text.
217. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 833.
218. 920 A.2d 34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). Koehler dismissed the Livingston v. Naylor
decision as an "anomaly" and limited to wage garnishments. See Reply Brief for PetitionerAppellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 161, at 14.
219. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 35-36.
220. Id. at 36. This case is factually significant because, like the bank in Koehler,
Marriott hotels maintain a presence in numerous different jurisdictions. See id. at 53.
221. Id. at 37.
222. Id. at 41 (referencing Shaffer's footnote thirty-six); see also supra notes 120-24, 165
and accompanying text.
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the debtor's assets within the state, if any, were subject to
determined that
2 23
garnishment.
The Livingston court distinguished, however, between the wages earned
by the judgment debtor while employed within Maryland and those earned
while employed within North Carolina. 224 The court expressed "little
concern" about garnishing the debtor's wages earned by him while
employed within Maryland. 225 However, the court noted that the wages
earned by the judgment debtor, while a resident of North Carolina and
while employed in North Carolina, were not within Maryland's jurisdiction,
even though the garnishee employer was. 226 Because the wages were not
within its jurisdiction, the court held that due process prohibited it from
garnishing the North Carolina wages. 227 Thus, to garnish the wages earned
court held, the
by the debtor while employed in North Carolina, the
228
courts.
state's
that
to
go
to
have
would
creditor
judgment
Nor could the Koehler dissenters find any support for the majority's
decision in the language of the CPLR statute. Looking at the statute, the
dissenters noted that the relevant sections in no way provided for an
extraterritorial interpretation. 229 The power to conduct such extraterritorial
is simply a question "that the text of the
garnishments, the dissent 2noted,
30
statutes does not answer."
223. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 49-50.
224. See id. at 51.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 53-54. The court also rejected the judgment creditor's argument that Harris's
"debt-follows-the-debtor" rule still applies to postjudgment garnishments and that the
judgment debtor's wages could be garnished anywhere and everywhere that Marriott Hotels
did business. See id. at 52-53. For support, the court cited an analogous holding in
Williamson v. Williamson, which prohibited a garnishment of the debtor's wages because the
wages due to the debtor by the garnishee could not practically be located everywhere the
garnishee-employer, the U.S. Army, was. 275 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. 1981). Some courts, however,
have applied Harris'srule to postjudgment garnishments. permitting the assets to be found
wherever the garnishee or debtor himself is. See supra note 79.
227. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 51 ("With respect to wages that are earned by a North
Carolina resident while working at facilities that are wholly within the State of North
Carolina ...and in the absence of some other connection between Maryland and either the
North Carolina wage-earner or the underlying controversy that resulted in the original North
Carolina judgment, we recognize a lack of fair play and substantial justice in permitting such
wages to be garnished by operation of a Maryland court order."). This holding seems to be
in accord with a literal reading of the Restatement's law on international judgment
enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 481 cmt. h (1987) ("[O]nce a judgment has been rendered in a forum having jurisdiction,
the prevailing party is entitled to have it satisfied out of the judgment debtor's assets
wherever they may be located." (emphasis added)). Interestingly, the Livingston court
conceded that Shaffer was a prejudgment decision. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 47. Citing to
footnote thirty-six, the court also admitted that this language indicated that prejudgment and
postjudgment analysis would differ. Id.
228. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 53.
229. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 832 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
230. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 832 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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The dissent then distinguished several cases that Koehler had relied
upon. 23 1 Every one of those cases, the dissenters noted, only required
232
judgment debtors, not garnishees, to bring their property into New York.
This, the dissent explained, made sense: judgment debtors, who can
physically control the property in ways garnishees cannot, could otherwise
move their property around in order to frustrate the enforcement of the
judgment. 233 Garnishees, such as the Bank, on the other hand, would have
234
no such interest in doing this.
The dissent also looked to a somewhat analogous case decided by the
Second Circuit.2 35 In United States v. First National City Bank,236 the
United States sought to garnish a Uruguayan corporation's assets from a
New York bank.2 37 The assets were deposited in the bank's branch outside
of the United States. 23 8 The Second Circuit refused to permit such a
garnishment on the grounds that a "garnishor obtains no greater right
against the garnishee than the garnishee's creditor had. ' 239 Thus, if the
corporation could not require the overseas deposits be paid in New York,
neither could the United States as creditor. 240 Analogizing to the present
case, the dissent noted that there was no reason to believe that the judgment
debtor here could have forced the Bank to deliver the stock certificates into
24 1
New York.
Additionally, the dissent warned, the majority's decision created a chance
that judgment creditors would flood to New York in order to enforce their
judgments. 242 All that would be required now is that the garnishee
institution have a branch or subsidiary operating in New York. 243 It would
be, as the dissenters said, "irrelevant whether New York has any
relationship with the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor or the dispute

231. See id. at 832-33.

232. Id. at 832; see also supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
233. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 832 (Smith, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
237. Id. at 16-17.
238. Id. at 16.
239. Id. at 19 (citing Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); Kamo-Smith Co. v.
Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1940); Wheeler v. Thomas, 31 F. Supp. 702 (D.D.C.
1940)).
240. Id.
241. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 832-33 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
242. Id. at 831. This was also stressed by both the Bank and the Clearing House in their
briefs, see supra note 192 and accompanying text, and recent commentary on the decision.
See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel supra note 7.
243. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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Such an opportunity, the dissent cautioned, would be a
between them." 244 245
"recipe for trouble."
As this Comment should make clear, the debate between the parties in
Koehler-which is in large part echoed by the majority and dissenting
opinions-reflects a significant disagreement about how postjudgment
garnishments should be analyzed. This disagreement, on such an important
step in the litigation process, is worrisome. Incredibly, much of the
confusion and debate can properly be traced back to a single footnote in the
Supreme Court's Shaffer opinion. 246 Accordingly, the Koehler decision can
be seen as an opinion synthesizing some of the main issues in postjudgment
jurisprudence. And, while the court's dismissal of due process concerns is
in accord with an established reading of the footnote, the sanction of an
extraterritorial garnishment breaks ground from a similarly established
understanding.
Part III of this Comment takes a closer look at the holdings of the
Koehler decision and the issues it addressed. Specifically, this Comment
will address the Koehler court's treatment of two issues: postjudgment due
process considerations and extraterritorial garnishments. This Comment
concludes that the Koehler decision was correctly decided, as it reflects
both a continuing trend in jurisdictional jurisprudence and realistically
addresses-and certainly ameliorates-the impediments faced by judgment
creditors in collecting on their judgments.
III. A

"RECIPE FOR TROUBLE"?:

24 7

WILL KoEHLER LEAVE A BAD TASTE IN

OUR MOUTHS?

Being a recent decision, the Koehler opinion's impact has yet to be
However, the possible implications have already been
determined.
recognized by several commentators. 24 8 For example, less than two months
after the decision, an article in the New York Law Journal stated that the
249
decision "is already being hailed as a landmark for judgment creditors."
This can hardly be contested-under Koehler, enforcing judgments in New
York just got a lot easier. However, as may be predictable, the Koehler
decision is likely to create disagreements within the legal community. One
250
article even suggests that the issue is ripe for Supreme Court review.
244. Id.
245. I. The dissenters seemed

rticlarly worried about the burden this would have on

larger banks. See id.
246. This is, of course, Shaffer's footnote thirty-six. See supra notes 81-83 and

accompanying text.
247. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J., dissenting).
248. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Newman, supra note 92; Siegel,
supra note 7.
249. Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133.
250. See Berger, supra note 4, at 439 ("Given the dissent's articulation of federal
constitutional concerns, further appellate practice in the case seems likely, and the issue may
ultimately land before the U.S. Supreme Court.").
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Despite these concerns, the Koehler decision was correctly decided. First,
the decision follows the trend of broadening jurisdictional analysis.
Second, the decision serves the noble purpose of assisting judgment
creditors in satisfying their rightfully earned judgments.
The Koehler decision can properly be divided as addressing two separate,
yet intertwined, issues: postjudgment due process and extraterritorial
garnishments. A closer look at each issue separately will make clear that
the Koehler decision was founded upon sound legal and practical
considerations.
A. PostjudgmentJurisdictionalDue Process25
Considerations:A "Greatly
Relaxed" Approach 1
The majority correctly, although surprisingly, refrained from engaging in
an extensive due process analysis in its decision. 2 52 This is justified:
typical prejudgment due process concerns should be irrelevant in
postjudgment garnishment proceedings. This holding has a legal basis in
Shaffer's footnote thirty-six, which implicitly recognizes the different roles
between adjudicating courts and enforcing courts. 2 53 The plain language of
this footnote indicates that the Supreme Court did not intend enforcement
2 54
proceedings to be subject to typical prejudgment due process scrutiny.
Since Shaffer, many courts and commentators have adopted this
approach.255
Policy considerations strongly support putting aside prejudgment due
process concerns in postjudgment garnishment proceedings. To begin,
courts must understand their role in a garnishment proceeding-to satisfy
the judgment that the judgment creditor won against the judgment debtor in
a previous action.2 56 That is, there already exists a judgment against the
defendant for some wrongdoing against the plaintiff. Accordingly, courts
251. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n.14 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. See supra note 209. It may be fair to assume that the majority's lack of focus on this
issue reflects its belief that this is, although disputed amongst the parties, a settled issue.
253. See supra notes 81-83, 120-24 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 81. This is also evident from the Supreme Court's Endicott decision.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 82-83, 120-24 and accompanying text. For counterarguments, see
Laurence, supra note 79; Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 81. In his article, Aristedes Diaz-Pedrosa
argues that the debtor's assets in a jurisdiction serve as a proxy for fair warning that the
debtor's activities may subject him to garnishment in that jurisdiction. See Diaz-Pedrosa,
supra note 81, at 45 ("If I ... acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly
assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my property." (quoting Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring))). Presumably, the author
would disagree with the Koehler decision and perhaps would argue that by depositing stock
certificates in the Bank of Bermuda the debtor had no warning or expectation that those
certificates could be garnished in New York. This argument has been endorsed in the
prejudgment attachment context. See supra note 94.
256. See Cappalli, supra note 11, at 115.
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should favor the interests of judgment creditors in satisfying their
outstanding judgment against the judgment debtor. 2 57 This lends favor to
permitting courts to satisfy the existing judgment without delay caused by
the debtor's due process concerns.
Moreover, requiring that a judgment debtor be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the enforcing court would enable judgment debtors to evade
enforcement. 258 First, a judgment debtor could easily distance himself and
his property from any connection to the enforcing state. 259 Essentially, the
judgment debtor would tailor his contacts in a manner to avoid being
subjected to the enforcing state's jurisdiction. Second, judgment debtors
would be able to essentially relitigate the jurisdictional basis of the existing
judgment. Litigating over the judgment debtor's contacts with the
enforcing state would require the time and money of the litigants and the
court. It would be burdensome on the courts because it is a fact-specific
and time-consuming task. 260 This would further delay the satisfaction of
the existing judgment and unfairly hinder the creditor's ability to satisfy his
26 1
judgment. Judgment debtors deserve no such second bite at the apple.
Enforcing courts should therefore adopt the "rearview mirror" approach: so
long as the existing judgment was rendered by a court properly exercising
262
jurisdiction, no further due process considerations are necessary.
B. ExtraterritorialGarnishment
The Koehler decision greatly expanded the reach of New York's
postjudgment garnishment procedure to assets in the possession of a present
garnishee but located outside of the state. While this holding may raise
concerns about valid state powers, 263 the decision is justified upon both
legal and practical considerations. First, the Supreme Court's jurisdictional
jurisprudence has indicated a shift away from the traditional understanding
of territorial boundaries as a limit of state power. 264 Second, it has been
settled law in numerous jurisdictions, including New York, that judgment
257. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 97, 121, 169-70 and accompanying text.
259. See Vernon, supra note 24, at 1008 ("The exemption of proceedings to realize on
judgments from the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe is pragmatically
necessary if judgment debtors are to be prevented from shielding their assets from judgment
creditors by shipping the assets to a state with which the underlying litigation had no prior
connection."). The Supreme Court in Shaffer also expressed such a concern that judgment
debtors would try to avoid paying off the judgment. See Shaffer 433 U.S. at 210 (noting that
a judgment debtor "'should not be able to avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient
of removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit' (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 cmt. a (1971))).
260. See supra Part l.A. 1-2.
261. Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 23 (Conn. 1984); Berger v. Berger, 417
A.2d 921, 922 (Vt. 1980).
262. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part I.A.1-2.
264. See supra Part I.A. 1-2.
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debtors may be ordered to turn over extraterritorial assets. 26 5 The Koehler
decision correctly held that it should make no difference whether the court
is directing a garnishee or judgment debtor subject to its jurisdiction to turn
over assets in its possession. Third, policy considerations, such as the
courts' interests in enforcing judgments, strongly support the use of
extraterritorial garnishments.
1. State Power and Sovereignty
Early doctrinal foundations of state power were based upon territorial
considerations. 2 66 This was Pennoyer's "power theory. ' 267 However, since
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis has shifted to reflect
modern technological and commercial realities-in today's economy, the
lines of jurisdictional borders have been somewhat blurred. 26 8 This is
demonstrated by the Supreme Court's more recent jurisprudence, starting
with International Shoe, which greatly expanded the potential reach of
states to property and persons beyond their borders. 2 69 This jurisprudence
reflects a decreasing concern with limiting state power to persons and
things solely within their borders. Accordingly, Pennoyer's power theory
270
no longer really defines a state court's power.
This expanding jurisdictional theory has reflected the reality that, in a
modem economy, the interests of courts may extend to persons or
properties beyond their borders. 271 This is particularly the case in the
postjudgment context, where a state court's power is considered to be
greater than if it were exercising prejudgment power. 272 Moreover,
postjudgment garnishments are procedurally different than prejudgment
attachments. 273 Postjudgment garnishments, as is evident from the Koehler
case, merely order the garnishee who has submitted itself to the enforcing
court's jurisdiction, and is legally obligated to obey the enforcing court's
orders, to transfer assets already in its possession in another state into the
enforcing state. 274 Accordingly, such procedures do not require an agent or
officer of the enforcing state to cross state lines, enter the territory where
the assets are located, physically seize them, and bring them back to the
enforcing state. This would, no doubt, raise serious state sovereignty
issues. 275 No such concerns exist in garnishment proceedings. The
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
seen as
270.
271.

See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35.
See supra Part I.A. 1-2. Admittedly, the Burnham decision, supra note 47, can be
a bump in the road.
See supra note 29.
See supra note 35.

272. See generally supra Part I.C.

273. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 23.
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Koehler court recognized this important distinction and permitted the
extraterritorial garnishment.
2. Garnishees and Judgment Debtors: "A Distinction Without a
276
Difference"
It is established law that courts may order a judgment debtor to turn over
out-of-state property. 277 While no New York court has permitted this for
garnishees, 27 8 Koehler argued and the court rightly agreed that nothing
should prohibit such an order. 279 Thus, the Koehler decision correctly
dismissed this alleged distinction between judgment debtors and
garnishees. 280 Courts should be able to order a party in postjudgment
proceedings, whether the party is a judgment debtor or garnishee, to act
upon assets in its possession but in another jurisdiction. Thus, if courts can
order judgment debtors to transfer such assets, there is no reason to prohibit
garnishees from doing the same. After all, parties subject to a court's
281
jurisdiction are legally obligated to obey its orders.
This certainly makes sense when one considers the nature of a
garnishment proceeding. Garnishments are independent suits that name the
garnishee as the defendant. 282 Accordingly, the garnishee is a real
defendant and should be treated as such. And, if the judgment debtor as a
real defendant in the initial litigation could be ordered to transfer
extraterritorial assets, so too should the garnishee as a real defendant in the
garnishment proceeding. 283 The Supreme Court has also indicated that
courts need not be concerned about the judgment debtor in postjudgment
284
garnishment proceedings-essentially, it is all about the garnishee.
3. Policy and the Need To Enforce Judgments
2 85
Every court has an interest in seeing all valid judgments enforced.
This is a desire that the entire legal community should share. However, the

276. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler, supra note 148, at 18.
277. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
278. The closest a New York court had come, before Koehler, was in dicta in an earlier
case. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 155-61, 206-09 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 149, 201-03 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
283. See United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("It is well
established that once the court has obtained personal jurisdiction over a party it may compel
performance of acts with respect to property located within or without its jurisdiction."
(citing United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962); First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v.
I.R.S., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960))).
284. See supra note 117. This is true, admittedly, to the extent that courts require
judgment debtors be given notice of the garnishment before it is done. See NEW YORK
PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 510.
285. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of judgments is a problem that has disturbed the legal system
for a long time, as seen in Abraham Lincoln's expression of frustration
almost a century-and-a-half ago. 2 86 Similarly frustrated judgment creditors
throughout the nation, and particularly in New York, have longed for a
decision like Koehler.
The Koehler decision is an incredibly powerful tool for judgment
creditors to use in order to satisfy their judgments. Particularly, it has the
potential to assist judgment creditors in reaching the assets of judgment
debtors who have shielded their assets from garnishment by evasive
maneuvering. If courts cannot reach assets outside of their jurisdiction,
judgment debtors will simply relocate their assets every time a judgment
creditor begins a garnishment proceeding in the jurisdiction where the
assets are located. This is even more likely for intangible property, which
can be relocated much easier and is more difficult to locate. 2 87 No
judgment debtor should be able to get away with this.2 88 The Koehler
decision prevents this.
To be fair, the recent critics of the Koehler decision are not entirely
misguided. First, as commentators have argued, this decision certainly
makes New York courts more attractive for judgment creditors seeking
satisfaction of their judgments. 289 However, if there is in fact a judgment
creditor "gold rush" upon the courts, it would be a reflection of a much
deeper problem: there are anxious judgment creditors out there who have
been unable to satisfy their judgments. The Koehler decision, for better or
worse, may be their savior. And, the satisfaction of valid and hard-earned
judgments far outweighs the slight possible increase of foot traffic in New
York's courts.
The second concern of these commentators is that the Koehler decision,
by making corporations within New York's jurisdiction the possible
garnishees of assets worldwide, might make New York a less attractive
place for corporations to do business. 290
While maintaining the
continuance of New York as a corporate and commercial headquarters is
vital to the state's economy, the concern expressed is somewhat
exaggerated. Put simply, it is very unlikely that corporations will close up
their operations in New York because of this decision. The loss to the
286. See supra note I and accompanying text.

287. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. With online banking, for example, a
simple click of the mouse could transfer a judgment debtor's assets.
288. This has long been a concern of the courts. See supra note 171; see also Shaffer v.

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977) (noting that a judgment debtor "'should not be able to
avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he
is not subject to an in personam suit' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 66 cmt. a (1971))). Although the Shaffer Court was addressing the postjudgment
due process requirement, the theory is analogous to a judgment debtor removing his assets to
a jurisdiction where an enforcing court cannot reach them.
289. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7.
290. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7.
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corporations of the advantages of doing business within New York would
far outweigh the occasional inconvenience of being a garnishee of out-ofstate property.
C. Don't Balk Too Soon: Can Harris v. Balk Help Us?
Some courts have perhaps crafted their own solution to this problem.
These courts still apply Harris's "the-debt-follows-the-debtor" rule to
postjudgment enforcement proceedings. 29 1 If the rule still applies to
postjudgment garnishments, courts can avoid the issues litigated by the
parties in Koehler merely by finding that such assets have a "presence"
wherever the garnishee may be found. Thus, so long as the garnishee is
subject to the enforcing court's jurisdiction, so too are the assets. This
theory may make sense when applied to assets such as bank deposits, which
might be "located" at any place they may be accessed, such as a bank
branch or automated teller machine.
This theory, however, is too much of a legal fiction. Although it perhaps
simplifies the role for a court addressing this issue, it does so in a vague and
illusory way. A Texas resident's bank deposits in a Houston branch of a
bank are not "located" in that same bank's New York branch once the
Texan becomes a judgment debtor and the bank a garnishee. 292 To reason
otherwise would demand an unreasonable stretch of the imagination, one
that, at least for prejudgment purposes, was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Shaffer when it overruled Harris.293 The satisfaction of judgments must
be founded upon practical and sound doctrine, for, as Siegel has stated,
is ruled by pragmatists. Theoreticians
"[t]he enforcement of judgments
294
have no fun at this party."
Thus, Koehler must be recognized for what it clearly stands for-a
significant decision that bravely charts its own course in the area of
postjudgment garnishments. And, for better or for worse, it will certainly
be exciting to see what, if any at all, impact the decision has. Also, given
the numerous legal and practical issues raised by the majority's decision, it
will be interesting to see if, and how, Koehler is welcomed in other
states. 2 95 Moreover, if the decision is ripe for further judicial revieweither by sister-state courts or the Supreme Court-the issues raised by
Koehler deserve greater academic attention.
291. See supra note 79.

292. Such a theory would lead to the bizarre conclusion that the judgment debtor's assets
are located in multiple places simultaneously. For example, if the assets are "present"
wherever the garnishee is, they are simultaneously present at every branch or subsidiary of
that garnishee institution. This creates serious problems when the garnishee is a multistate,
or even a multinational, institution. See, e.g., supra note 226.
293. See supra note 79.
294. NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 485.

295. New York may continue as a rogue state on the issue, or may convince other states
to similarly change their garnishment procedure.
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Yet, as of now, it is too early to prophesize the impact of the decision.
Thus, only until judgment creditors come flocking to New York courts, as
some fear, can we say for sure that New York has become a "mecca" for
creditors. What we may conclude, however, is this: The Koehler decision
is an incredible one, arming judgment creditors with a significantly
powerful tool to enable them to reach judgment debtors' assets located all
over the world. And though it may have taken quite some time, perhaps
now Abraham Lincoln's call that judgment creditors "must be somehow
296
paid" will have finally fallen upon concerned ears.

296. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Samuel C. Davis & Co., supra note 1, at 338.

